Once again, for the mega-multiplicity of times, I have been presented with an article praising the Spartan 300 at Thermopylae and using their example to support anything from a new brand of underwear to most of the right wing policies of the Republican party of the United States. As usual, the author of the article describes themselves vaguely as an expert in the field (“I’ve been teaching Ancient Greek history for 30 years”), and presents their position as unassailable fact:
The Spartans, led by Leonidas, marched north to the Gates of Fire and courageously defended them against the Persians for several days until every single one of them died. As a result, the Persians lost so many soldiers that their assault on Greece was blunted and because their navy was also beaten by the Greek one, they lost the war. Just goes to show you what real men can do and also…
Now, I was raised on the story of Leonidas and his 300 and have always held them in tremendous awe and respect. They were, indeed, truly great soldiers and citizens. But I have also learned to hold the historical truth in great awe and respect and to realize that it is sometimes complicated. And the story told above, well, it would be an adequate rendering for a 9 year old, but not an adult. So let’s go back and look at what really happened.
Our primary source, in many ways our only source for the truth, is the father of history, Herodotus. There are other accounts of the battle but they were written much later and, although based on earlier sources, are missing many of the details. There was a time, even in this century, when Herodotus (nicknamed:“ The Father of Lies”) was mocked for his “errors” and “exaggeration” but recent archeological discoveries have born out his veracity. So we will take his word for what happened at Thermopylae (with a little help from Simonides of Ceos).
First, we need to accept that the reason that the battle was fought at all was somewhat less than just the noble cause of Greek liberty. The problem was the inability of the various city-states who refused to surrender to the Persians, to come to an agreement on strategy. Corinth, Sparta and the other cities of the Peloponnesus wished to withdraw the Greek forces below the isthmus of Corinth and even to build a wall across the isthmus – a step that would be unlikely to prove useful since the Persians had a larger fleet than the combined Greek navy so they could have landed troops anywhere in the Peloponnesus behind the wall. The Athenians (and the few Cities north of the Gulf that had not already submitted to the Medes) did not like this strategy since it involved abandoning their cities to the ungentle mercies of the enemy.
The alternative was to send both armies and the navy north to the Hot Gates and force a showdown there. The advantage to this was that the only passage in eastern Greece, from the north to the south, lay through the place known as Thermopylae (there actually were hot baths there that were quite popular) and there was no known way to bypass the place. At least it wasn’t known before the battle. The navy was required to prevent the Persians from doing an end-runaround the Greeks and taking them from both sides. Unfortunately, the timing was bad. Not only was it the Spartan Festival of Carneia when military action was forbidden (the same Festival that had kept the Spartans from sending aid to the Athenians at the battle of Marathon) but it was also the time of the Olympic games, which made military endeavors doubly sacrilegious. So what was sent north was a holding force consisting of Leonidas and 300 of his body guard(hand-picked by Leonidas and all of them fathers of living sons), with the instructions to scrape together an allied Greek army on the way north and hold the pass until the main army could show up. Also, the entire Greek navy, under the Athenian Themistocles, was sent to the area of Artemesium for the reasons already mentioned.
As was always the case before undertaking anything major the Greeks consulted the oracle at Delphi. The response, reported in Herodotus was as follows:
O ye men who dwell in the streets of broad Lacedaemon!
Honour the festival of the Carneia!! Otherwise,
Either your glorious town shall be sacked by the children of Perseus,
Or, in exchange, must all through the whole Laconian country
Mourn for the loss of a king, descendant of great Heracles.
Now Delphi (not exactly famous for the clarity or cheeriness of its advice) was at least definite about one thing: a king, descended from Heracles would have to die or Sparta would be taken. So at least one thing was abundantly clear: King Leonidas (one of the two Spartan kings) was of the Agiad family which claimed descent from Cadmus and Heracles therefore, presumably, had to die to save Sparta. He was also a much better general than the other king (also descended from Heracles). So that’s why Leonidas was sent.
On his way Leonidas picked up considerable re-enforcements (considering that he started with 300 men (not counting the helot slaves that went along). According to Herodotus, he picked up the following volunteers: 500 from Tegea, 500 from Mantinea, 120 from Orchomenus in Arcadia, 1000 from the rest of Arcadia, 400 from Corinth, 200 from Philius, and80 from Mycenae. In addition to these troops from the Peloponnesus, there were1,000 Locrians and almost as many Phokians. Also there were 400 from Thebes and700 from Thespiae. Therefore, the actual number of the Greek army sent to Thermopylae was 6200, not 300. Because of his prestige and experience, Leonidas commanded the entire army.
The army of the Medes – which Leonidas was sent to “hold” – was impossibly large. We will start with Herodotus’s numbers. The Persian army was drawn from every part of their enormous empire. The infantry was numbered at 1,700,000 men and the cavalry at 80,000. When you add in the servants, baggage men and attendants, the total is 5,283,300 men. Herodotus says that he didn’t count the dogs. He says that the army drank the rivers dry – and it’s likely that they did. He also said that the fleet numbered 1207 ships of war manned by 241,00 fighting men. While Herodotus’ numbers are probably inflated the 20th century habit of drastically reducing them has begun to wear thin. Contemporary archeological studies have tended to support even some of Herodotus’s wilder ideas. The Persian Empire was colossal in size and the Persian monarchy, over two generations, had grown tohate the Greeks with a vengeance. And this was their big chance. I’m inclined to lean towards Herodotus’ side of the numbers.
The idea behind the Greek’s move was to hold the enemy at Thermopylae for a few days until the Festival was over and the Olympic period ended and then each city, led by Sparta, would send their main armies to reinforce the pass. No one expected the Medes to move as fast as they did with such a big army. However, their first move was a complete and unnecessary disaster. They sent their entire fleet to a landing spot near Atemisium (where the Greek fleet had been beached) called Cape Sepias. However, there was no room for most of the fleet to anchor. At that moment a huge storm struck them, a real “Hellespontian” and they lost an enormous part of their fleet – Herodotus says 400 ships – almost a quarter of their strength. Herodotus tells the story with his usual dry wit:
The storm lasted three days, after which the Magi (Persian Holy Men) brought it to an end by sacrificial offerings, and by putting spells on the wind, and by further offerings to Thetis and the sea-nymphs – or, of course, it may be, that the wind just dropped naturally.
The men of Greece and particularly the men of the fleet were thrilled. They felt that the gods of nature were on their side.
When the small army led by Leonidas reached the pass, they began to be aware of the danger they were in facing such a colossal force. The repaired an old wall across the pass, left by the Phocians from an earlier battle and debated whether they should stay or fly from the advancing enemy. They decided to stay since many of them had little choice. Leonidas had his orders and a number of the non-Spartans lived in city-states not all that far behind them down the pass. If they were going to stand against the Persians, like the Athenians had at Marathon, there was no better place to do it and so they decided to stay.
There are many “sub-stories” that have attached themselves to the main story of the battle – some in Herodotus and some not. Herodotus writes that a spy was sent by Xerxes to observe the Greek position at Pylae and he happened to arrive when the Spartans were on duty guarding the wall. These men were at ease, some stripped for exercise, some combing out their long hair. He did a thorough count and went back and reported to his Lord. Xerxes was bewildered. How could so few men hope to hold any position against his numbers? Why on the eave of battle were they behaving in such an odd manner? Who were these guys? There happened to be a Spartan in his entourage who came foreword to explain. “These are Spartans, Lord, of whom I have spoken to you before. It is their custom to pay special attention to their hair when they are about to die and deliver death. These are the finest warriors in Greece.” But Xerxes did not believe him. In fact, he waited at the foot of the pass for four days, expecting the Greek army to make its escape.
Or the story of the envoy that was sent to accept the surrender of the Greek armies. When they refused he tried to frighten them with the statement that “the arrows of the Persian archers would be so multitudinous that they would block out the sun.” A veteran hoplite retorted, “Good, then for once we will fight in the shade.” Now this might seem to some an odd piece of gallows humor but when a hoplite phalanx is in proper formation arrows are only a mild irritant. They are tank-like in their armor and shields (hoplon). But fighting in armor, in Greece, in the summer, must have been pretty tough. And, of course, there is the apocryphal tale that when a Persian envoy asked Leonidas for the weapons of his army to be handed over, he responded: “Come and get them.”
In any case, Xerxes and his soldiers presumed that the Greeks would be easily shouldered aside and that soon the way south would be clear for the great army. For two long days the Persians and all their vassal states threw themselves at the Greeks, who fought by shift so that they were always fresh. The Persians had the numbers but the Greeks had the phalanx, which out-classed anything the enemy could throw at them. Sometimes the Spartans would suddenly break rank and flee and when the enemy was at their heels, they would just as suddenly re-form the phalanx and begin the slaughter. In the narrow pass the Greeks were unbeatable.
Eventually, the Persians found a local man named Ephialtes, who showed them a goat path that took the Persian Immortals to the rear of the Greek army on the pass. And that was the end of the stand at Thermopylae.
When it was clear that they had been flanked and the pass was untenable, Leonidas sent his allies home with thanks. He and his men had their orders, ‘hold until relieved,’ and they had not been relieved. The others had no such orders and their death would have been pointless. And so, the allied army that had been scraped together left and only the 300 remained. Except that that is not true, at least according to Herodotus. For while most of the allies left, what was left of the 700 Thespians chose to remain and fight to the end. The fight was brutal, for the Greeks were short of spears and even swords. At the end, says Herodotus, they had their backs to the cliff wall and died fighting with their bare hands and teeth, among them Leonidas.
So it was not as simple as the story of 300 Spartans who fought alone against the Persian army. In fact if I were handing out medals for bravery I would privilege the Thespians. After all, the Allies fought bravely and effectively against a vast horde from the east. And when they were given their chance to leave with honour, they did and who could blame them. The Spartans were ordered to hold until relieved and there is little doubt that they soon realized that they were not going to be relieved. Still, they held till their death. But the Thespians had no such orders and they were released by Leonidas and still they stayed and fought. Theirs is the greater glory.
Now, there are those who say that Thermopylae was a useless effort that gained nothing, not even time. And even though the losses of the Persians were enormous compared to the tiny army that the Greeks had fielded, the losses were miniscule compared to the army that remained for Xerxes to wield. But this is beside the point. What the Greeks had gained, at land and at sea, was a knowledge of the vulnerability of the invader. And the knowledge that, given the right ground, a few Greeks could stand against many Persians. What had been gained was morale and, as Napoleon once said, morale is worth three times an army’s strength. The Hot Gates made the war winnable for the Greeks.
